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Abstract
In random incentive mechanisms agents choose from multiple problems and a
randomization device selects a single problem to determine payment. Agents are
assumed to act as if they faced each problem on its own. While this approach is
valid when agents are expected utility maximizers, ambiguity-averse agents may use
the randomization device to hedge and thereby contaminate the data.
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1 Introduction
Experimental economists often ask subjects to choose from several different problems
simultaneously. One of these problems is then randomly drawn; the subject’s choice from
this problem determines the outcome of the experiment. The agent might, for example, be
asked to report choices from six different sets of bets, with the experimenter then rolling
a die to determine which of the six choices is payoff-relevant. Any experimental design
which uses a randomization device to elicit choices from several problems is a random
incentive mechanism.
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If a subject’s choice from each separate problem is identical to his choice from the
same problem when it appears as part of a random incentive mechanism, the mechanism
has many advantages over separate single choice experiments. First, large sets of data can
be elicited with one payment. Second, the payments do not accrue; so the later choices
in an experiment are not affected by the agent’s earlier earnings or losses. Finally and
most importantly, to check for behavioral regularities we must elicit choices from various
problems; a single choice experiment carries no information about the consistency of an
agent’s behavior. But if an agent’s behavior in a random incentive mechanism differs from
his behavior in separate choice situations it is not clear how one should interpret the data
generated by the mechanism.
Random incentive mechanisms have been used widely in the experimental literature
on ambiguity aversion (Camerer and Weber [5], Halevy [10] and Ahn et al. [1]). However,
there are no theoretical results on the incentives for ambiguity-averse agents to reveal
their true preferences in such mechanisms. The present study argues that random incen-
tive mechanisms stand on shaky ground when agents are ambiguity-averse. Consider a
mechanism that is designed to elicit preferences over ambiguous acts. Let all acts that
the agent can choose in the mechanism be conditioned on a set of possibly ambiguous
events. If this set of events is independent of the randomization device then the agent can
use the randomization device to hedge against the ambiguity associated with his choices.
Preference reversals, where agents behave differently in random incentive mechanisms and
in single choice experiments, will occur.
Example: an urn and a coin. There is an urn filled with 30 blue balls and 60
green and red balls in unknown proportion. We are interested in an agent’s preferences
over “urn-acts” f = (f(B), f(G), f(R)) where f(B), f(G) and f(R) denote the agent’s
utility-payoffs in the events B, G, and R that a blue, green, or red ball is drawn.1 Let the
agent choose among a “blue act” that delivers utility 5 when a blue ball is drawn from
the urn, a “green act” that delivers utility 9 when a green ball is drawn and a “red act”
which also delivers 9 when a red ball is drawn. Represent these acts as blue : = (5, 0, 0),
1The assumption that acts map to lotteries over outcomes is more common. If we assume that an
agent’s preferences over objective lotteries has an expected utility representation on lotteries, we can
derive acts f which directly map states to utilities from more basic acts g which map to lotteries over
outcomes by letting f(ω) = u(g(ω)) for every state ω.
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green : = (0, 9, 0) and red : = (0, 0, 9).
Assuming our agent believes that the probability of a blue ball is 1
3
the preference
blue  green ∼ red is inconsistent with expected utility theory. If our agent was an
expected utility maximizer he would have to believe that either R or G occurs with a
probability of at least 1
3
. Consequently his preferred act among red and green would have
to deliver an expected utility of at least 1
3
× 9 whereas blue delivers only 1
3
× 5. But an
ambiguity-averse agent might well prefer the objective lottery blue to the acts green and
red that leave winning probabilities uncertain. Would an ambiguity-averse agent reveal
the preference blue  green ∼ red in a random incentive mechanism?
To pose this question concretely, let the preference % over acts f be represented by
a maxmin expected utility U(f) = minpi∈C
∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω). Unlike an expected utility
maximizer our agent holds a set of beliefs C on the state space Ω, not a single prior. He
calculates an expected utility with respect to every prior in C and evaluates his overall
utility as the lowest among these. To match our assumption that the agent believes a
blue ball is drawn with probability 1
3
, let pi(B) = 1
3
hold for all pi ∈ C. To reflect the
agent’s uncertainty about the probabilities of green and red balls let pi(G) either equal
1
9
or 5
9
, implying that pi(R) also equals either 1
9
or 5
9
.2 So our agent evaluates any urn-
act by either pired = (1
3
, 1
9
, 5
9
) or pigreen = (1
3
, 5
9
, 1
9
) where the components of these vectors
denote the probabilities of the events B, G and R. Since our agent believes that a blue
ball is drawn with probability 1
3
, his utility of blue is 1
3
× 5. His utility of green is just
pired(G)9 = 1, since pired is the most pessimistic prior in C to evaluate green. Similarly,
the agent’s utility of red is pigreen(R)9 = 1. Our agent prefers blue to green and red.
Now let’s construct a random incentive mechanism to elicit these preferences. First, let
us ask our agent to choose one act each from SH : = {blue, green} and ST : = {blue, red}.
Let us then toss a fair coin to declare one of these two choices as payoff-relevant. If heads
comes up, the agent is paid according to his choice from SH , otherwise he is paid according
to his choice from ST .
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To model the agent’s behavior we need to specify his preferences over acts that are
not only conditioned on the events B,G and R but also on the events H and T that the
coin comes up heads or tails. Define the state space Ω such that any state ω ∈ Ω is the
2Since C is not convex, U deviates from the maximin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
[8]. The analysis goes through unchanged if we replace C with its convex hull.
3This example was inspired by the experimental setup in Ahn et al. [1].
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intersection of a coin- and an urn-event. For example, the unique state ω at which the
coin comes up heads and a blue ball is drawn is defined by {ω} = H ∩B. Assuming that
the agent assigns probability 1
2
to heads and tails, let C consist of the priors defined by
the following two matrices:
B G R
H 1
6
1
18
5
18
T 1
6
1
18
5
18
B G R
H 1
6
5
18
1
18
T 1
6
5
18
1
18
According to C, the agent evaluates any urn-act at pired or at pigreen and he assigns a
probability of 1
2
to either side of the coin. The coin and the urn are independent according
to either prior in C; we have, for example, pired(H ∩R) = pired(H)pired(R).
Consider the choice of green from SH and red from ST in random incentive mechanism.
For any prior pi in C the expected utility of this plan is 1
2
pi(G)9+ 1
2
pi(R)9. As pi(G)+pi(R) =
2
3
holds for any pi ∈ C, this expected utility equals 1
2
pi(G)9 + 1
2
(2
3
− pi(G))9 = 3 for any
prior pi ∈ C. Consequently the maxmin expected utility of this plan also equals 3. On the
other hand, choosing blue from both sets yields a utility of only minpi∈C pi(B)5 = 53 . The
remaining two options (choosing blue from exactly one of the two sets) deliver a yet lower
utility. In sum, there is a preference reversal. While the agent prefers blue to green and
red it is optimal for him to choose green from SH and red from ST in the mechanism. 
The main result of the paper shows that the preceding example is no accident. Pref-
erence reversals must occur when agents are ambiguity-averse. To make this point I
consider the two most popular models of ambiguity-averse preferences: the maxmin ex-
pected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [8] and Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji’s
[16] model of smooth ambiguity aversion. Fix a randomization device D, defined by a set
of “coin-events”, and a set of - possibly ambiguous - events A. Consider the set of random
incentive mechanisms that present the agent with choice-sets of acts that are conditioned
on events in A and that use the randomization device D to determine which of the agent’s
choices is operative for payment. Assume that D and A are independent and that the
agent is strictly ambiguity-averse with respect to acts conditioned on A. Theorem 1 shows
that the agent’s preference must exhibit a reversal in some mechanism in this set. Such
reversals can be ruled out only if the agent is an expected utility maximizer with respect
to the acts under study.
Schmeidler [20] suggests that “intuitively, uncertainty aversion means that ‘smoothing’
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or averaging utility distributions makes the decision maker better off.” This is exactly
what happens here: our experimental subject uses the coin to smooth the two utility
distributions associated with uncertain acts green and red. On its own, each of these
acts delivers utility 9 in one uncertain event and 0 otherwise. But in the compound act
according to which green is played if the coin comes up heads and red is played if tails,
the event R is neither as advantageous as it is under red nor as unfavorable as it is under
green. If the event R occurs the compound act delivers utility 9 with tails and 0 with
heads and vice versa for G. The coin, therefore, averages the utilities delivered by the two
urn-acts green and red. In the present case, this averaging or hedging is efficient enough
to make the agent’s choices in the random incentive mechanism differ from his choices in
the two single choice experiments.
My arguments share some similarity with Karni and Safra’s [13] and Holt’s [11] analysis
of preference reversals in random incentive mechanisms. These two studies show that
some empirically well-documented reversals (Lichtenstein and Slovic [17] and Grether
and Plott [9]) of preferences over lotteries are consistent with the assumption that agents
have rank-dependent preferences. Similarly to the present paper, Karni and Safra [13]
and Holt [11] argue that, without the assumption of expected utility preferences, an
agent’s behavior in the random incentive mechanism as a whole need not reflect the
agent’s behavior in single choice experiments. However Karni and Safra [13] and Holt [11]
do not address the question whether random incentive mechanisms truthfully elicit the
preferences of ambiguity-averse agents; their studies consider only the case of objective
lotteries. To make sure that my results are driven by ambiguity aversion alone, I assume
that preferences over objective lotteries have expected utility representations.
Bade [3] first raised the issue that an ambiguity-averse agents might use the random-
ization device of an experiment to hedge and thereby contaminate the data. Since then
other authors have made related observations. Kuzmics [15] notes that it is impossible
to detect the Ellsberg paradox experimentally if subjects can use coin tosses to smooth
out all ambiguity in the experiment. Working in a more general setup Azrieli, Chambers
and Healy [2] study the family of preferences under which random incentive mechanisms
are incentive compatible. Oechssler and Roomets [18] point out that there is a potential
hedging problem in experiments that use random incentives with ambiguity-averse agents.
Noting the same problem, Baillon, Halevy and Li [4] identify conditions on the agent’s
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preferences under which the incentive compatibility of random incentive mechanisms is
restored. In Section 4 I argue that it is impossible to ascertain whether or not these
conditions are met in any particular case.
The fact that some experimental studies on ambiguity aversion, such as Stahl [21],
find inconclusive results can be viewed as empirical motivation for my study. If experi-
mental subjects use the randomization device as a hedging device, the full extent of their
ambiguity aversion will not be visible in the data. If other subjects do not hedge, the
empirical picture might turn out very hard to analyze.
2 Definitions
2.1 Basics. The agent has a complete and transitive preference % over acts which are
functions from a finite state space Ω to R. Under the act f the agent obtains utility
f(ω) in state ω. Anscombe-Aumann acts, in contrast, map a state space to lotteries over
outcomes. If we assume an expected utility representation u over lotteries, then we can
map any Anscombe-Aumann act g to an act f : Ω→ R by letting f(ω) : = u(g(ω)) for all
ω ∈ Ω. A constant act maps every state to the same utility level x ∈ R. As a shorthand
a constant act is also denoted x. The constant act xf ∈ R that is indifferent to f is the
certainty equivalent of f . For any pair of acts f, g and event E ⊂ Ω, the compound
act fEg delivers f(ω) if ω ∈ E and g(ω) otherwise. If f and g are constant acts then fEg
is a bet (on E). In the compound act greenHred in the introductory example payoffs
are determined by green in case of heads and by red in case of tails. The acts blue, green
and red are all bets.
Fix some partition P of Ω. Then f is a P-act if any two states in the same cell of P
yield the same utility level. For any P-act f and any cell E of P let f(E) : = f(ω) when
ω ∈ E. Any union of events in P is a P-event, the complement of E is E, and ∆Ω is the
set of probability distributions on Ω. For any pi ∈ ∆Ω, the marginal distribution on P
(the restriction of pi to P-events) is piP . The conditional distribution of P-events given E
is piP(· | E).
2.2 Random Incentive Mechanisms. The experimenter is interested in an agent’s
preference over the set of A-acts, where some events in the partition A might be ambigu-
ous. The experiment uses a randomization device D. Formally D : = {D1, . . . , Dn} is
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another partition of the state space Ω into n cells. Both A and D are fixed throughout.
In terms of the introductory example we have D = {H,T} and A = {B,G,R}. Since
the events in the partitions A and D are the only ones that matter to the present study,
I assume that any state is the intersection of a D-event and an A-event: each ω ∈ Ω is
identified with a pair of events A ∈ A and Di ∈ D such that {ω} = A ∩Di.
A random incentive mechanism S is an indexed collection {S1, . . . , Sn} of sets Si
of A acts. The agent chooses one act from each Si. Which of these acts is payoff relevant
depends on the randomization device D: if Di is drawn, the agent is paid according to
his choice from Si. Any list of choices (f [1], . . . , f [n]) ∈ (S1 × · · · × Sn) defines an act
f : Ω → R that is available in S via f(ω) = f [i](A) for {ω} = Di ∩ A. Conversely,
an act f : Ω → R is available in S if for each i there exists some f ′ ∈ Si such that
f(A ∩ Di) = f ′(A) for all A ∈ A. For any available f , define a set of n A-acts f [i] via
f [i](A) : = f(A ∩Di) for all A ∈ A. The preference % does not exhibit a preference
reversal in the random incentive mechanism S if the following equivalence holds for any
available f ∗ in S4:
f ∗ % f for all available f in S ⇔
f ∗[i] % f [i] for all f [i] ∈ Si and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
So% does not exhibit a preference reversal in S if the agent chooses the same f ∗[i] from the
set Si, whether he faces just that choice or has to choose from the entire list {S1, . . . , Sn}.
Conversely, % exhibits a preference reversal in S if the agent’s optimal choices within
the mechanism differ from his optimal choices in the separate choice problems. If %
does not exhibit a preference reversal in any random incentive mechanism (that uses the
randomization device D to elicit preferences over A-acts) then % is transparent.
2.3 Representations. A representation U of the preference % is a MMEU represen-
tation (maxmin expected utility representation, Gilboa and Schmeidler [8]) if there exists
a convex and compact set of beliefs C on Ω such that U(f) = minpi∈C
∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω) for
all acts f : Ω → R. A representation V is a SAA representation (smooth ambiguity
aversion representation, Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji [16]) if there exists a concave
function φ : R → R and a probability measure µ on the set of priors ∆Ω such that
4To clarify, for ⇒ the A-acts f∗[i] and f [i] are derived from f∗ and f , while for ⇐ f∗ and f are
derived from the A-acts f∗[i] and f [i].
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V (f) =
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω)
)
dµ(pi) for all acts f : Ω → R. Given that acts directly
map states to utilities in this paper, a MMEU representation is defined through the set
of beliefs C, and a SAA representation is defined through the prior over priors µ and the
function φ. A preference that has either a MMEU or a SAA representation is strictly
ambiguity-averse if it does not have an expected utility representation.
2.4 Independence. Given a probability measure pi, two events E1 and E2 are (stochas-
tically) independent if the probability of both events occurring equals the product of
their probabilities, pi(E1 ∩ E2) = pi(E1)pi(E2). Two partitions P1 and P2 are (stochasti-
cally) independent if any P1-event E1 and a P2-event E2 are independent.
Since the representations we consider involve multiple priors we cannot use the stan-
dard notion of independence to define the independence of D and A. Instead we need
a behavioral concept of independence, which I define following Klibanoff [14]. Fix two
events E1 and E2 and a bet b, that delivers 1 if E2 occurs and 0 otherwise. Consider the
compound act bE1xb according to which the agent gets to play the bet b if E1 occurs and
receives xb, the certainty equivalent of b, otherwise. If the agent is an expected utility
maximizer with a prior pi according to which E1 and E2 are independent then he must be
indifferent between bE1xb and xb. The reason is that the two acts differ only in the event
E1, and, due to the independence of E1 and E2, the preferred outcome of the bet b is just
as likely under pi(· | E1) as it is under pi.
Transferring this intuition to any preference %, say that the events E1 and E2 are
“independent” if bEixb ∼ b holds for all bets b on Ej and all {i, j} = {1, 2}. If the
indifference bE1xb ∼ b holds for a bet b on E2 then the value that the agent assigns to b
does not depend on E1 occurring or not. So the agent cannot consider his preferred event
under b, be it E2 or E2, to be correlated with E1. Generalizing this idea to the case of
two partitions P1 and P2 we obtain:
Definition 1 Two partitions P1 and P2 on Ω are (behaviorally) independent accord-
ing to % if f ∼ fExf holds for all pairs of a Pj-act f and a Pi-event E with {i, j} = {1, 2}.
This definition applies the intuition developed above to any combination of a Pi-event
and a Pj-act, not just bets. Klibanoff [14] shows that behavioral independence reduces
to the classical definition when % has an expected utility representation.
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3 An Impossibility Result
Independent randomization devices offer agents the opportunity to hedge. When the agent
does hedge, his choices in the mechanism appear to be more ambiguity accepting than the
choices he would make if he faced the problems separately. Any strictly ambiguity-averse
preference exhibits a reversal in some random incentive mechanism with an independent
randomization device. For the statement of the following theorem, recall that (1) % is
a binary relation on acts f : Ω → R, (2) each state ω ∈ Ω is the intersection of a D-
event and an A-event, (3) % is transparent if it does not exhibit a reversal in any random
incentive mechanism that uses D to elicit preferences over A-acts, and (4) %, which either
has a MMEU or a SAA representation, is strictly ambiguity averse if and only if it does
not have an expected utility representation.
Theorem 1 Let % either have a MMEU or a SAA representation and let A and D be
independent according to %. If % is transparent, then the restriction of % to A-acts has
an expected utility representation.
If experiments use an independent randomization device to elicit preferences that can
be represented by either of the two most prominent theories of ambiguity aversion, then
Theorem 1 presents a dilemma: if the preferences under investigation (the preferences over
A-acts) are strictly ambiguity averse, then % must exhibit reversals in some experiments.
The proof of Theorem 1, which can be found in the Appendix, starts by translating
transparency into a condition on preferences. Lemma 1 shows that % is transparent if
and only if any act f is for any i indifferent to fDixf [i], which is identical to f except
that the outcomes of f when some Di obtains (f [i]) are replaced by xf [i], the certainty
equivalent of f [i]. If the condition holds the agent prefers f [i]Dig to f
′[i]Dig if and only if
he prefers the A-act f [i] to the A-act f ′[i]: the act g which is paid if Di does not occur
is irrelevant for agents preference over f [i]Dig and f
′[i]Dig.
Now fix an agent’s MMEU preferences over A-acts and over D-acts; that is fix two sets
of beliefs C∗A and C
∗
D on A and D, respectively. Consider all MMEU preferences on acts
f : Ω → R that coincide with these fixed preferences on the sets of A-acts and D-acts.
Lemma 2 shows that such a preference is transparent if and only if it is represented by a
belief set C that consists of all priors pi on Ω with the following two features. First piD,
the distribution of the randomization device implied by pi, is contained in C∗D. Second,
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piA(· | Di) ∈ C∗A holds for all Di ∈ D, so conditioning on any event of the randomization
device, the distribution on A belongs to C∗A.5 To evaluate an f , an agent with such a
representation separately calculates the MMEU of each A-act f [i] using the set of beliefs
C∗A. The MMEU of f is a weighed average of these MMEUs.
Reconsidering the introductory example of the urn and the coin, let the set of priors
on the coin C∗D contain only the prior where heads and tails are equally likely. Let the
set of priors on the urn C∗A consist of the two priors pi
red = (1
3
, 1
9
, 5
9
) and pigreen = (1
3
, 5
9
, 1
9
).
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that a transparent MMEU is defined by a set C ′ that consists of
the following four priors:
B G R
H 1
6
1
18
5
18
T 1
6
1
18
5
18
B G R
H 1
6
5
18
1
18
T 1
6
5
18
1
18
B G R
H 1
6
1
18
5
18
T 1
6
5
18
1
18
B G R
H 1
6
5
18
1
18
T 1
6
1
18
5
18
The first two priors make up the set C in the introductory example: both satisfy
piD(H) = 12 and piA(· | H), piA(· | T ) ∈ {pired, pigreen}. However, C does not fit Lemma 2’s
characterization of transparent MMEU-preferences as it misses some pi with piD(H) = 12
and piA(· | H), piA(· | T ) ∈ {pired, pigreen}. According to the first two priors the agent
evaluates the urn act in case of heads and the urn act in case of tails at the same posterior.
Hedging occurs since the agent does not choose two different posteriors to pessimistically
maximize the probability of the worst outcome of the two different bets. The hedging
problem disappears under the MMEU defined by C ′ as the agent separately chooses either
pired or pigreen to evaluate the urn-act in case of heads and the urn-act in case of tails.
Lemma 4 shows that D and A cannot be independent if % has a representation that
is characterized by Lemma 2 and if % is strictly ambiguity averse with respect to A-acts
(CA not a singleton). The two partitions A and D are not interchangeable in Lemma
2’s characterization: The conditions, piD ∈ CD and piA(· | Di) ∈ CA for all Di ∈ D treat
A and D differently. This asymmetry clashes with the independence-requirement which
treats the two partitions symmetrically.
The proof for the case of SAA-preferences follows the same pattern. Lemma 3 char-
acterizes the set of transparent SAA preferences. According to any such SAA representa-
5The resulting set of beliefs is rectangular with respect to the filtration {D1, . . . , Dn} in the sense of
Epstein and Schneider [7]. This means that full Bayesian updating with respect to any Di is dynamically
consistent. What is not implied by dynamic consistency but by independence is that the set of posteriors
on A when updating with respect to Di is identical to the set of priors on A.
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tion, the agent is an expected utility maximizer with respect to the randomization device.
Moreover the agent’s unconditional prior over priors on A is identical to the agent’s con-
ditional prior over priors on A given any event Di of the randomization device. Lemma
4 also concludes the proof of the SAA-part of Theorem 1: transparency in the context
of ambiguity aversion requires an asymmetry between the agent’s beliefs on D and on A
that cannot coexist with the symmetric independence property.
4 Discussion
Theorem 1 is due to the clash among transparency, ambiguity aversion, and independence.
To salvage random incentive mechanisms on might firstly impose a weaker notion of
independence, secondly to drop independence altogether or thirdly weaken transparency.
Given that there is no agreed upon notion of stochastic independence for ambiguity-
averse preferences one might consider replacing Klibanoff’s [14] notion of independence by
a weaker one. However, Klibanoff’s [14] notion is the weakest in the literature. Gilboa and
Schmeidler [8], for example, introduced a more restrictive notion of independence in their
original article on MMEU representations: any two events that are independent according
to that notion are also independent according to Klibanoff’s [14]. Hence, Theorem 1
remains valid if independence is defined following Gilboa and Schmeidler [8].
Second, Lemmas 2 and 3 in the Appendix demonstrate that transparency and strict
ambiguity aversion can be reconciled - if we replace independence by a no-hedging con-
dition. To justify random incentive mechanisms Baillon, Halevy and Li [4] as well as
Johnson et al. [12] refer to conditions on an agent’s preferences under which a randomiza-
tion device is not used for hedging. A new question arises: which randomization devices
meet these conditions? Saito [19] convincingly argues that the suitability of a random-
ization device to hedge is a feature of the individual’s preferences. He tells two equally
appealing stories on the interaction between coin tosses and Ellsberg urns. According
to one of these stories a coin toss serves to hedge away all uncertainty in the Ellsberg
experiment, according to the other the coin does not mitigate the effects of uncertainty.
So decision theory provides no guidance for the design of hedging-proof randomization
devices. An empirical investigation whether an agent considers a randomization device
well suited to hedge would require a large set of choice data. But to elicit such data we
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would have to set up a random incentive mechanism within which the agent does not
hedge. Seemingly no progress has been made.
The third suggestion is to weaken transparency. Consider a mechanism in the coin-
urn example in which the agent only gets to choose among “G-acts”, whose payoff in the
event G is at least as high as their payoff in the event R. Given that the better payoff
is associated with the same ambiguous event for all acts that can be chosen, there is no
hedging opportunity in such a mechanism. If we assume that any such mechanism is
transparent we can truthfully elicit the agent’s preferences over G-acts. Since there is
no a priori difference between green and red balls in the description of the urn we might
assume that the agent is indifferent between any f and h with f(G) = h(R), f(R) = h(G)
and f(B) = h(B). Combining the weakened transparency assumption with the symmetry
assumption we can identify the agent’s preference over any two acts. This approach indeed
works for the agent with the MMEU preferences defined in the introduction. But for a
preference over a more complex set of acts it might not be so easy to identify a subset
of mechanisms where the preference does not exhibit reversals and to find an assumption
that allows the researcher to derive the remainder of the preference from the elicited choice
data. Consider payoff plans that are conditioned on the size and student evaluation scores
of a particular class. Without any obvious “symmetry” between sizes and scores, it is hard
to come up with an assumption that would relate preferences over acts conditioned on
scores to preferences over acts conditioned on class sizes.
Finally, let me conjecture that other classes of ambiguity averse preferences suffer
from the same hedging-in-experiments problem. Specifically, I believe that the conclusion
of Theorem 1 holds for any uncertainty averse preference as defined by Cerreia-Vioglio,
Maccheroni, Marinacci and Montrucchio [6].
5 Appendix
For any partition P of Ω let σP denote the algebra generated by P . So an event E is a
P-event if and only if E ∈ σP and f is a P-act if and only if f is σA-measurable. Let %P
denote the restriction of % to the set of P-acts. For any set C ⊂ ∆Ω and any partition P
of Ω define CP as the set marginal distributions on piP of all priors in the set C, formally
CP = {piP | pi ∈ C}. Let ΣA be the algebra on ∆Ω generated by the partition of ∆Ω into
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sets {pi | piA = pi∗A}. For any prior µ over priors ∆Ω, let µΣA be the marginal distribution
with respect to the algebra ΣA. For any set S let co(S) be the convex hull of the set S,
so co(S) is the smallest convex set that contains S.
An event E is ambiguous according to a MMEU-representation associated with the
set of beliefs C if {pi(E) | pi ∈ C} is not a singleton. If % has a SAA representation
associated with µ, φ, then E is ambiguous if φ is strictly concave and {pi(E) | pi ∈ supp(µ)}
is neither a singleton nor a subset of {0, 1}. The preference %A is strictly ambiguity
averse if and only if there exists an ambiguous A-event. If no A-event is ambiguous and
if %A either has a MMEU- or an SAA-representation, then %A has an expected utility
representation. Represent any f : Ω→ R as f : = (f [1], . . . , f [n]) with the understanding
that f [i] is a A-act defined by f [i](A) = f(ω) for {ω} = A ∩Di and write f ∈ S if f is
available in S.
The randomization device D is isolated from A if f ∼ xDif holds for x ∈ R, act
f and Di ∈ D if and only if x ∼ f [i]. So if D is isolated from A then knowing Di
does not make f [i] any more or less attractive than xf [i], no matter what happens for all
the other outcomes of the randomization device. If D is isolated from A then we have
f = (f [1], . . . , f [n]) ∼ (xf [1], . . . , f [n]) ∼ (xf [1], xf [2], . . . , f [n]) ∼ · · · ∼ (xf [1], . . . xf [n])
(Fact 1). This observation is used in the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2:
Lemma 1 Assume that % is monotonic in the sense that f % f ′ holds when f(ω) % f ′(ω)
holds for all ω. Then % is transparent if and only if D is isolated from A.
Proof The statement can be formalized as (I)⇔ (II) with
(I) : (f ∗ % f ∀f ∈ S)⇔ (f ∗[i] % f [i] ∀ f [i] ∈ Si, i) ∀(S, f ∗ ∈ S)
(II) : (xDif ∼ f)⇔ (x ∼ f [i]) ∀(x, i, f).
To see (I)⇒ (II), fix a triple (x, i∗, f ∗) and assume that (II) does not hold. To simplify
notation let g : = f ∗[i∗] and Di∗ : = D.
First assume that f ◦ : = xDf ∗ ∼ f ∗ and x 6∼ g hold. Define S through Si∗ = {x, g}
and Si = {f ∗[i]} for all i 6= i∗. So f ◦ ∼ f ∗ % f holds for all f ∈ S, however x 6∼ g implies
that one of the two acts f ◦[i∗] = x and f ∗[i∗] = g must be strictly preferred. So (I) is
violated. Next assume that f ◦ : = xgDf
∗ 6∼ f ∗ holds. Define S through Si∗ = {xg, g} and
Si = {f ∗[i]} for all i 6= i∗. Observe that f ◦[i] ∼ f ∗[i] % f [i] holds for all f [i] ∈ Si and all
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i (including i∗), however f ◦ 6∼ f ∗ implies that one of these two acts must be preferred to
the other. So - once again - (I) is violated.
To see (II)⇒ (I) fix a tuple (S, f ∗ ∈ S) and assume that (II) holds.
First assume that f ∗ % f holds for all f ∈ S while f ∗[i∗] ≺ g holds for some i∗ and
g ∈ Si∗ . Let Di∗ : = D and define x such that f ∗ ∼ xDf ∗ holds. By (II) x is uniquely
defined through x ∼ f ∗[i∗]. This, f ∗[i∗] ≺ g, and monotonicity imply xDf ∗ ≺ xgDf ∗.
Applying (II) once again we obtain xgDf
∗ ∼ gDf ∗ and therefore gDf ∗  f ∗, which
stands in contradiction with f ∗ % f for all f ∈ S. We can conclude that (f ∗ % f ∀f ∈ S)
implies (f ∗[i] % f [i] ∀ f [i] ∈ Si, i) if (II) holds. Now assume that f ∗[i] % f [i] holds for
all f [i] ∈ Si and all i. So we have that xf∗[i] % xf [i] holds for all f [i] ∈ Si and all i.
Monotonicity and Fact 1 (which follows from (II)) imply that f ∗ ∼ (xf∗[1], . . . , xf∗[n]) %
(xf [1], . . . , xf [n]) ∼ f holds for all f ∈ S. In sum we obtain that (f ∗[i] % f [i] ∀ f [i] ∈ Si, i)
implies (f ∗ % f ∀f ∈ S) when (II) holds. 
Lemma 2 Assume that % has a MMEU representation U(f) = minpi∈C
∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω)
and let C∗ : = co
({pi | piD ∈ CD and piA(|˙Di) ∈ CA for all i = 1, . . . , n}). Then D is
isolated from A if and only if C∗ = C as well as pi(Di) > 0 for all i and pi ∈ C.
Proof Let C = C∗ as well as pi(Di) > 0 for all i and pi ∈ C. Fix any act f and i∗,
define Di∗ : = D and f [i
∗] : = g, so U(f) = U(gDf) can be calculated as
min
pi∈C
(
pi(D)
∑
A∈A
g(A)pi(A | D) +
∑
i 6=i∗
pi(Di)
∑
A∈A
f [i](A)pi(A | Di)
)
=
pi∗D(D) min
piA∈CA
∑
A∈A
g(A)piA(A) +
∑
i 6=i∗
pi∗D(Di) min
piiA∈CA
∑
A∈A
f [i](A)piiA(A) =
pi∗D(D)xg +
∑
i 6=i∗
pi∗D(Di) min
piiA∈CA
∑
A∈A
f [i](A)piiA(A) = U
(
xgDf
)
.
Letting pi∗D ∈ CD be the marginal on D at which the sum is minimized, the first first
equality follows from C = C∗. The second follows from the definition of the certainty
equivalent of g. The third is once again implied by the definition of C = C∗. Since pi∗D(D)
is positive U(f) = U
(
xDf
)
holds only if x = xg. So D is isolated from A.
To see the necessity of the conditions for isolation, observe that isolation is violated if
pi∗(D) = 0 held for some D ∈ D and pi∗ ∈ C. In that case we have U(1D0) = 0 = U(0) =
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U(0D0) and 1 6∼ 0, a violation of isolation. 6
Next suppose that C∗ 6= C. First suppose there exists a pi∗ ∈ C∗ \C. Since C and C∗
are both convex the separating hyperplane theorem implies the existence of an act f ∗ such
that minpi∈C∗
∑
Ω f
∗(ω)pi(ω) < minpi∈C
∑
Ω f
∗(ω)pi(ω). The arguments in the sufficiency
part of the proof imply that minpi∈C∗
∑
Ω f
∗(ω)pi(ω) = minpiD∈CD
∑n
i=1 piD(Di)xf∗[i] =
U
(
(xf∗[1], . . . , xf∗[n])
)
and we obtain (xf∗[1], xf∗[2], . . . , xf∗[n]) ≺ f ∗. But since D is isolated
from A, Fact 1 implies (xf∗[1], xf∗[2], . . . , xf∗[n]) ∼ f ∗, a contradiction. The case that there
exists a pi∗ ∈ C \ C∗ is covered by the same arguments mutatis mutandis. 
Lemma 3 Assume that % has a SAA representation V (f) =
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω)
)
dµ(pi)
and that the preference %A over A-acts is strictly ambiguity-averse. Then D is isolated
of A if and only if pi(D)pi(D) = 0, µ({pi | pi(D) = 1}) > 0 and µΣA = µΣA(· | pi(D) = 1)
hold for all D ∈ D and all pi ∈ supp(µ).
Proof First assume that pi(D)pi(D) = 0, µ({pi | pi(D) = 1}) > 0 and µΣA = µΣA(· |
pi(D) = 1) hold for all D ∈ D and all pi ∈ supp(µ). Fix any act f and i∗, define Di∗ : = D
and f [i∗] : = g. Since pi(D)pi(D) = 0 holds for all pi ∈ supp(µ) we can represent V (f) =
V (gDf) as
∫
∆Ω,pi(D)=1
φ
(∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω)
)
dµ(pi)+
∫
∆Ω,pi(D)=0
φ
(∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω)
)
dµ(pi). Rewrite
the first term of the sum as follows:∫
∆Ω,pi(D)=1
φ
(∑
Ω
f(ω)pi(ω)
)
dµ(pi) =
∫
∆Ω,pi(D)=1
φ
(∑
A∈A
g(A)pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) =
µ({pi | pi(D) = 1})
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
A∈A
g(A)pi(A)
)
dµ(pi | pi(D) = 1) =
µ({pi | pi(D) = 1})
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
A∈A
g(A)pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) =
µ({pi | pi(D) = 1})φ(xg) = ∫
∆Ω,pi(D)=1
φ
(
xg
)
dµ(pi).
The first and second equality follow from the restriction to probability measures pi with
pi(D) = 1 and the definition of the conditional probability µ(· | pi(D) = 1). The third
equality holds since the marginal µΣA is equal to the conditional marginal µΣA(· | pi(D) =
1). The fourth equality uses the definition of the certainty equivalent of g. In sum we
6This argument also applies to the ambiguity neutral case: % is not transparent if the agent has an
expected utility representation with a prior pi such that pi(D) = 0 holds for some D ∈ D.
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have V
(
f
)
= V
(
gDf
)
= V
(
xgDf
)
. Since µ({pi | pi(D) = 1}) is positive the equality
V
(
f
)
= V
(
xDf
)
holds if and only if x = xg. So D is isolated from A. To see the
necessity of the conditions for isolation, suppose first of all that µ({pi | pi(D) = 1}) = 0
held for some D. Then we have V (1D0) = 0 = V (0) = V (0D0) even though 1 6∼ 0. So
isolation is violated.
Next suppose that pi∗(D)pi∗(D) 6= 0 held for some pi∗ ∈ supp(µ) and D ∈ D. Since %A
is strictly ambiguity-averse there must exist an A-event A such that {pi(A) | pi ∈ supp(µ)}
is neither a singleton set, nor a subset of {0, 1}, moreover φ must be strictly concave.
Normalize φ such that φ(0) = 0 and φ is strictly concave in some neighborhood around
0. Implicitly define a continuous function y : R+0 → R−0 through V
(
xAy(x)
)
= 0 and let
b[x] : = xAy(x), so y(0) = 0.
Since D is isolated from A, b[x]D0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0Db[x] must hold for all x ≥ 0:
0 = V
(
b[x]D0
)
+ V
(
0Db[x]
)
=∫
∆Ω
φ
(
xpi(A ∩D) + y(x)pi(A ∩D))dµ(pi) + ∫
∆Ω
φ
(
xpi(A ∩D) + y(x)pi(A ∩D))dµ(pi) =∫
∆Ω
φ
(
xpi(A ∩D) + y(x)pi(A ∩D))+ φ(xpi(A ∩D) + y(x)pi(A ∩D))dµ(pi) ≥∫
∆Ω
φ
(
xpi(A ∩D) + y(x)pi(A ∩D) + xpi(A ∩D) + y(x)pi(A ∩D))dµ(pi) =∫
∆Ω
φ
(
xpi(A) + y(x)pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) = V (b[x]) = 0
The concavity of φ implies the weak inequality.
The strict concavity of φ at 0 together with the assumption that φ(0) = 0 implies that
φ(α) +φ(β) > φ(α+ β) holds, if and only if α 6= 0 6= β. So either xpi(A∩D) + y(x)pi(A∩
D) = 0 or xpi(A∩D) + y(x)pi(A∩D) = 0 or both must must hold for any pi ∈ supp(µ), in
particular for pi∗. Since y is a continuously decreasing function with y(0) = 0, y(x) = −ρx
must hold for ρ either pi
∗(A∩D)
pi∗(A∩D) or
pi∗(A∩D)
pi∗(A∩D) . For any arbitrary x we then obtain
0 = V (b[
x
2
]) =
∫
∆Ω
φ
(
(
1
2
0 +
1
2
x)(pi(A)− ρpi(A)))dµ(pi) >
1
2
∫
∆Ω
φ(0)dµ(pi) +
1
2
∫
∆Ω
φ(x(pi(A)− ρpi(A)))dµ(pi) = 0 + 1
2
V (b[x]) = 0.
The inequality follows since φ is strictly concave around 0, and since pi(A) − ρpi(A) 6= 0
must hold for a set of pi that has positive measure according to µ (given that {pi(A) | pi ∈
supp(µ)} is not a singleton). The conclusion follows from φ(0) = 0 and the definition of
b[x]. In sum pi(D)pi(D) = 0 must hold for all pi ∈ supp(µ) and all D ∈ D.
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If µΣA 6= µΣA(· | pi(D) = 1) holds for some D ∈ D then there exists an A-act f with∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
A∈A
f(A)dpi(ω)
)
dµ(pi) 6=
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
A∈A
f(A)dpi(ω)
)
dµ(pi | pi(D) = 1).
For f we have the contradiction V
(
fDxf
)
=
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
A(fDxf )(A)pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) =
µ({pi | pi(D) = 1})
∫
∆Ω
φ
(∑
A∈A
f(A)dpi(ω)
)
dµ(pi | pi(D) = 1) + µ({pi | pi(D) = 0})φ(xf ) 6=
µ({pi | pi(D) = 1})φ(xf ) + µ({pi | pi(D) = 0})φ(xf ) = V (f).
The inequality is implied by µ({pi | pi(D) = 1}) > 0. 
Lemma 4 Assume that % either has a MMEU or an SAA representation, that D is
isolated from A and that %A is strictly ambiguity-averse. Then D and A cannot be
independent.
Proof Since %A is strictly ambiguity-averse there exists an ambiguous A-event A. Fix
a D ∈ D and define a value x and a bet b such that b = 1Dx ∼ 0. I show that bA0 6∼ 0
holds for either representation contradicting the independence of D and A which requires
bA0 ∼ 0.
If the preference has the MMEU representation U(f) = minpi∈C
∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω), then
x = −minpi∈C
(
pi(D)/pi(D)
)
: = pi∗(D)/pi∗(D) holds; Lemma 2 implies pi∗(D) 6= 0 6=
pi∗(D) and x 6= 0. We can calculate U(bA0) as
min
pi∈C
(
pi(A ∩D) + xpi(A ∩D) + 0pi(A)
)
= min
pi1∈CD,pi2,pi3∈CA
(
pi2(A)pi1(D) + xpi3(A)pi1(D)
)
=
min
pi2∈CA
pi2(A)pi∗(D) + x max
pi3∈CA
pi3(A)pi∗(D) = pi∗(D)( min
pi2∈CA
pi2(A)− max
pi3∈CA
pi3(A)) < 0
The first equality follows from Lemma 2 which shows that C must be defined as co({pi |
piD ∈ CD and piA(· | Di) ∈ CA for all i = 1, . . . , n}) for D to be isolated from A. The
second equality recognizes the fact that a difference is minimized through minimising
the minuend and maximizing the subtrahend. The third uses the definition of x. The
inequality holds since A is ambiguous, meaning that {pi(A) | pi ∈ C} is not a singleton.
Now assume that % has the SAA representation V (f) =
∫
∆Ω
φ(
∑
Ω f(ω)pi(ω))dµ(pi)
with φ(0) = 0 and φ strictly concave in some open interval around 0. Since b ∼ 0, we
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have V (b) = λφ(1) + (1− λ)φ(x) = 0 for λ : = µ({pi | pi(D) = 1}).
V (bA0) =
∫
∆Ω
φ
(
(pi(A ∩D) + xpi(A ∩D) + 0pi(A ∩D) + 0pi(A ∩D)))pi(ω)
)
dµ(pi) =
λ
∫
∆Ω
φ
(
pi(A) + 0pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) + (1− λ)
∫
∆Ω
φ
(
xpi(A) + 0pi(A))
)
dµ(pi) >
λ
∫
∆Ω
(
φ(1)pi(A) + φ(0)pi(A))
)
dµ(pi) + (1− λ)
∫
∆Ω
(
φ(x)pi(A) + φ(0)pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) =∫
∆Ω
(
(λφ(1) + (1− λ)φ(x))pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) =
∫
∆Ω
(
0pi(A)
)
dµ(pi) = 0.
The first equality follows from the definition of bA0. The second equality is implied by
Lemma 3 which shows that pi(D)pi(D) = 0 and µΣA = µΣA(· | pi(D) = 1) must hold for
all D ∈ D and all pi ∈ supp(µ) for D to be isolated from A when %A is strictly ambiguity-
averse. The inequality follows from the assumption that φ is strictly concave around 0
and µ({pi | 0 < pi(A) < 1}) > 0 as implied by A being ambiguous. The next equality
follows from φ(0) = 0, finally V (b) = λφ(1) + (1− λ)φ(x) = 0 yields the conclusion. 
To prove Theorem 1 all preceding Lemmas need to be combined: Assume that % has
a MMEU or a SAA representation. Given that % is monotonic, Lemma 1 applies; % is
transparent if and only if D is isolated from A. Lemma 4 shows that D and A cannot be
independent if D is isolated from A and if %A is strictly ambiguity-averse.
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